Abstract
INTRODUCTION
A common contention in the public fi nance literature is that redistribution should occur primarily at the national level (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972) . According to this argument, if state or local governments attempt to impose redistributive income taxes, cross-state mobility will lead to a compensating increase in gross wages for high-skill workers. If full adjustment occurs, then net wages for low-skill and high-skill workers will be unaffected by the rise in redistributivity.
This argument suggests that more redistributive state taxes result in effi ciency losses without achieving any net redistribution. If true, it suggests that states should focus on raising revenues in the most effi cient manner possible, rather than attempting to redistribute between the rich and the poor. The hypothesis also has implications for labor market mobility within the European Union. Particularly between pairs of neighboring countries with a common language (e.g., France and Belgium; Germany and Austria; Britain and Ireland), a rise in tax redistribution in one country may merely lead to cross-border migration, driving up pre-tax inequality, and leaving post-tax inequality unchanged.
Using data from the 1983 and 1989 U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS), Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) fi nd that when states implement more redistributive income tax systems, wages become more unequal (i.e., wages of high-skill workers rise by enough to offset the higher tax rates). They conclude that this adjustment process is rapid: controlling for the 1989 tax structure, tax rates in 1983 have no effect on gross wages in 1989. This is consistent with Blanchard and Katz (1992) , who observe relatively rapid migration out of high unemployment areas in response to adverse demand shocks, with the unemployment rate returning to normal after a period of fi ve to seven years.
Others, however, have found more modest effects. Focusing on the top end of the income distribution, and using annual tabulations of estate tax returns from 1965 -1998 , Bakija and Slemrod (2004 conclude that higher state sales taxes and inheritance/estate taxes have modest but signifi cant negative impacts on the number of federal estate tax returns fi led in a state. The rich do fl ee from higher state taxes, but the resulting deadweight loss is small relative to the revenue raised. This is consistent with Conway and Houtenville (2001) who use migration data from the 1990 Census to investigate the migration patterns of those aged 65 and over. They fi nd that although the elderly are attracted to states with lower personal income and inheritance/estate taxes, the magnitude of the effect is small, and the results are sensitive to the particular specifi cation chosen. 1 Similarly, studies of welfare and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) have not observed substantial effects at the lower end of the distribution. Cushing-Daniels (2004 ) uses the 1968 Panel Study of Income Dynamics to study the impact of welfare generosity on mobility, and fi nds that benefits do not have a significant effect on cross-state migration. Leigh (2004 Leigh ( ) uses the 1989 Leigh ( -2002 CPS to explore the impact of state EITCs on earnings, and concludes that only a small portion of the observed effect could have been due to workers moving into states with more generous EITCs.
From a theoretical standpoint, the extent to which the pre-tax wage distribution will adjust to offset the effect of redistributive taxes depends on the degree to which workers are willing to change location in response to taxes. As Mirrlees (1982) has shown, the optimal amount of redistribution by a particular jurisdiction is a declining function of the degree of mobility in response to taxes. This is generally interpreted to mean that there should be more redistribution at the national level than at the state level, and more redistribution at the state level than at the local level. But whether migration can entirely offset the redistributive effects of taxation at any particular level is ultimately an empirical question.
Since the sharpest empirical predictions about the effect of redistributive taxes on inequality relate to the distribution of hourly wages, this paper, therefore, focuses on hourly wage inequality. For expositional simplicity, I will often refer to this just as "inequality."
2 To assess the impact of redistributive taxes on gross earnings, I use the National Bureau of Economic Research's Taxsim program (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) to create a measure of the redistributive effect of personal income taxes across U.S. states over the years . Separately calculating inequality from the March CPS over those same years, I fi nd that more redistributive taxes are not offset by a rise in pre-tax inequality. Analyzing mobility, 1 Although the effect of taxes on wage inequality is determined at the margin, it is worth noting that in 1990, the middle year of the data range covered by this paper, 67 percent of native-born Americans lived in their state of birth (Census Bureau, 1994) . 2 From a social welfare perspective, the income distribution measure that is most commonly utilized is the post-tax distribution of income across families or households, adjusted for household size. That measure will be affected by hourly wage inequality, but also by differences in labor supply and non-labor income, by whether the household is single-headed or partnered (and the extent of assortative matching in the latter case), and by the number of children in the household.
I do not fi nd clear evidence that more redistributive taxes affect the volume or composition of interstate migration.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second section analyzes the impact of redistributive taxes on inequality, using a standard measure of the redistributive effect of taxation, and presents a number of robustness checks on this specifi cation. The third section proposes a new class of tax redistributivity measures, based on the S-Gini, and uses these measures to see whether the effect of taxes on gross wages has a stronger effect on the top or bottom of the distribution. The fourth section studies the effect of redistributive taxes on migration, post-tax inequality, and incomes. The fi fth section delves into the political economy of redistributive taxation, and the sixth section concludes.
HOW DO REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXES AFFECT THE PRE-TAX GINI COEFFICIENT?
To test the impact of redistributive taxation on inequality, Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) regress an individual's gross hourly wage on his or her average tax rate, using data from 1983 and 1989. Since the average tax rate is endogenous to hourly earnings, they instrument for the actual average tax rate with a predicted average tax rate, based on demographic characteristics.
A more reduced form approach, which will be implemented here, is to regress a measure of the distribution of hourly wages on a measure of tax redistribution, controlling for state and year fi xed effects, and for certain time-varying state characteristics. If it is the case that more redistributive taxes raise the pre-tax hourly wages of high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers, there should be a positive relationship between redistributive taxes and hourly wage inequality.
Data are drawn from the March CPS, covering earnings in the years 1977-2002. Using these surveys, the redistributive effect of taxation and hourly wage inequality are separately estimated for each state and year. Over this relatively long time period, it is also possible to estimate different lag specifi cations, taking account of the possibility that it may take some time before the wage distribution fully adjusts to changes in taxation.
What is the appropriate measure of the redistributive effect of taxation? For simplicity, I adapt the Reynolds-Smolensky index (Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977) , which simply measures the amount by which taxation changes the Gini coefficient for hourly wages. In its usual defi nition, the Reynolds-Smolensky index (RS) is the difference between the Gini coeffi cient for after-tax earnings (GA) and the Gini coeffi cient for before-tax earnings (GB), such that RS = GA -GB. To obtain a measure that is increasing with the redistributive effect, I swap the terms to obtain the index GB -GA. Using a measure of the redistributive effect of taxation that is based on the Gini coeffi cient makes it natural to measure hourly wage inequality using the Gini. In the third section, I explore the robustness of these results to the use of alternative measures of inequality.
The redistributive effect of taxation is different from the progressivity of taxes. The redistributive effect is a function of three parameters: the average tax rate, tax progressivity (the disproportionality of tax payments), and the re-ranking effect (which occurs when the tax system takes account of non-income differences). The three measures are discussed and related to one another in Creedy (1999) . For the purposes of considering the impact that taxes have on the distribution of wages, what matters is the redistributive effect, since this fully encapsulates the effect of the tax system on the distribution of incomes, regardless of whether that effect is due to changes in the average tax rate, progressivity, or re-ranking.
Redistributive taxes will potentially affect inequality via two channels. First, because taxes typically take a larger income share of the rich than the poor, tax policies will have a "mechanical" effect on inequality. Second, redistributive taxes may engender a behavioral response, for example, by prompting changes in labor supply or affecting residential choices. In measuring the effect of tax policies on behavior, it is important to form an index of redistribution that measures only the mechanical policy effect of a tax, uncontaminated by any behavioral response. To do this, I calculate the redistributive effect of taxation based not upon the actual after-tax Gini and before-tax Gini in a given state and year, but based on the effect of the taxation system in every state and year on one single sample of households, drawn from the March 1990 CPS. (The March 1990 CPS was chosen on the basis that it is the midpoint of the period 1977-2002, but drawing a sample from another year makes no substantial difference to the results.) This "simulated redistribution index" reflects the mechanical policy impact of the taxation system, but not any behavioral changes that are induced by a more or less redistributive tax system. More details may be found in the Data Appendix.
The measure of redistribution used here accounts only for personal income taxes. While I control for sales taxes and the top rate of inheritance/estate taxes, I do not estimate their redistributive effect (and I do not control for other taxes, such as property taxes). To the extent that the redistributive effect of personal income taxes is positively correlated with the redistributive effect of other taxes, mine will be an underestimate of the true effect. To the extent that the redistributive effect of personal income taxes is negatively correlated with the redistributive effect of other taxes, mine will be an overestimate. However, it is somewhat reassuring to note that Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) found that omitting the redistributive effect of sales taxes made only a slight difference to their estimates.
Both the redistributive effect of taxation and inequality are calculated from the distribution of hourly wages among adults aged 16-55 with positive earnings. The mean of the pre-tax Gini coeffi cient for the distribution of hourly wages is 0.36 with a standard deviation of 0.018. Within a state, the largest one-year movements observed in the data are -5 Gini points and +6 Gini points. At the 10th and 90th percentiles, the one-year movements are -2 and +2 Gini points respectively. Summary statistics are presented in Appendix  Table 1 .
On average, the mechanical effect of income taxes was to reduce the Gini coeffi cient by 0.024 (i.e., by 2.4 Gini points), with a standard deviation of 0.003. However, this standard deviation overstates the extent of within-state variation in the redistributive effect of taxation. Focusing only on one-year within-state changes, the largest increase and decrease observed in the data are -0.4 and +0.4 Gini points. The changes at the 10th and 90th percentiles are -0.2 Gini points and +0.1 Gini points respectively. Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of pre-tax hourly wage Gini coeffi cients for the 50 states and the District of Columbia over the period . The steady upwards trend accords with the well-recognized rise in wage inequality over this period (see for example Autor, Katz, and Kear-ney, 2008) .
4 Figure 2 depicts a scatter plot of the redistributive effect of taxation. Taxes became more redistributive in the late-1970s, less redistributive in the 1980s (due to the federal Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), followed by reductions in redistributivity in some states), and slightly more redistributive again in the 1990s.
To get some sense of the within-state relationship between taxes and inequality, Figure 3 plots hourly wage inequality against the tax redistribution measure for the four most populous states in the United States: California, Florida, New York, and Texas. There are two reasons for choosing these states. First, they constitute a signifi cant fraction of the U.S. population (around 30 percent). Second, using large states reduces the measurement error in estimating inequality using the CPS. It is diffi cult from this graph to discern any strong positive relationship between redistributivity and pre-tax inequality. The largest rises in hourly wage inequality have occurred in California and New York; in both cases these have taken place at a time when tax redistributivity was either falling or stable.
Clearly, national trends dominate the four graphs. Since the empirical specifi cation will include year fi xed effects, Figure 4 shows the results for the same four states, but this time with inequality and redistributivity expressed as the 4 Note that the measure of inequality here is based purely on earnings. Since the CPS does not contain information on fringe benefi ts, it is conceivable that employers may respond to changes in taxation by shifting remuneration from earnings into fringe benefi ts. To the extent that the redistributive effect of taxes and the propensity of employers to remunerate high-skill workers through fringe benefi ts are positively correlated, mine will be an underestimate of the effect of redistributive taxes on inequality. .015
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is the amount by which taxation mechanically reduces the Gini coeffi cient, GB is the Gini coefficient for before-tax inequality, Z are time-varying state characteristics, ζ is a vector of state dummies, λ is a vector of year fi xed effects, and T is a region-specifi c linear time trend.
Note that the year dummies remove most of the impact of changes in federal income taxes, leaving the effects of state income taxes.
5 This approach is preferable to estimating the redistributive effect of state taxes alone, since it allows for interaction between state and federal taxes. State fi xed effects take account of time-invariant factors that may be correlated with both the dependent variable and the key independent variable, such as residents' taste for inequality or redistributive taxation. Including a linear time trend for each of the four Census regions (Midwest, Northeast, South, and West), allows for the possibility that long-run linear changes in a particular part of the United States-perhaps due to changing industrial composition-might have affected both inequality and taxation The year fi xed effects do not perfectly purge the data of the effects of changes in federal tax rates, since state and federal income taxes interact through deductibility rules.
systems. The vector Z includes three other state taxes that might be correlated with state income taxes: the sales tax rate, the maximum state inheritance or estate tax rate, and an indicator for whether the state has an estate tax. It also includes three variables that might affect wage inequality: the unemployment rate, the log of real per capita personal income, and the unionization rate. (Below, I show that the results are robust to excluding these controls.) Standard errors are clustered at the state level, allowing for an arbitrary covariance structure over time within each state (Bertrand, Dufl o, and Mullainathan, 2004) .
The coeffi cient on β can be interpreted as follows.
• β = 0: more redistributive taxes have no impact on the pre-tax distribution of income.
• β < 0: more redistributive taxes not only have a mechanical effect of equalizing the wage distribution, but also lead the pre-tax wage distribution to become more equal.
• 0 < β < 1: a tax system that has the mechanical effect of reducing the Gini by one point leads to a compensating increase in the pre-tax distribution of income of less than one Gini point, partly attenuating the equalizing effects of the tax change.
• β = 1: a tax system that has the mechanical effect of reducing the Gini by one point leads to a compensating one Gini point increase in the pre-tax distribution of income, with the net result being that the post-tax distribution of wages remains unaffected by the redistributive effects of the tax.
• β > 1: the pre-tax wage distribution overcompensates for the effect of more redistributive taxes, with the result that more redistributive taxes cause the post-tax wage distribution to become more unequal.
Although it is possible to come up with explanations as to why β might be less than zero or greater than one, the main focus of the theoretical literature has been over whether β is closer to zero or to one.
6
The empirical analysis below will, therefore, focus on the question of whether β is closer to zero or to one. By ignoring the hypotheses with less theoretical support (β < 0 and β > 1), it is possible to construct a clearer "horserace" between the two most plausible explanations: that wages adjust to fully offset tax changes, or that wages do not adjust to offset tax changes.
It is possible that taxes may affect wages only with some lag. If this is the case, then simply regressing current inequality on current redistributivity may miss part of the adjustment process. Therefore I experiment with adding up to six lagged terms to the model. In the case of six lags, I estimate the equation
The six-year limit is necessarily arbitrary, but is chosen on the basis that it is the lag length used by Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) , who analyze the period 6 Two plausible explanations for β < 0 are that states with more redistributive taxes use the additional revenue to create jobs for low-skilled workers, or that the infl ow of low-skill workers leads to the formation of a union which raises the wages of all low-skilled workers. A possible explanation for β > 1 is that more redistributive taxes lead to an economic slump, which harms low-wage workers more than high-wage workers. In addition, either result could occur if tax redistribution is endogenous with respect to some other policy that affects wage inequality, and is not controlled for in the regressions. [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] . Since tax rates are only available from 1977 onwards, all regressions are restricted to cover the same period, that is, 1983-2002. 7 One might imagine several different processes through which taxes affect the distribution of wages. Wage inequality might be affected only by the current tax system, only by a previous year's tax system, or by some combination of the two. To take in account of these various possibilities, I present both current and lagged coeffi cients. In addition, I estimate the linear sum of the lagged redistributivity coeffi cients, and the linear sum of all redistributivity coefficients.
8 I then present a one-tailed F-test against the null hypothesis that the sum of the coeffi cients is equal to or smaller than zero (which would imply that the wage distribution does not become more unequal in response to more redistributive taxes), and a one-tailed F-test against the null hypothesis that the sum of the coeffi cients is equal to or greater than one (which would imply that the wage distribution fully adjusts in response to taxes).
The rationale for using one-tailed F-tests, rather than the standard twotailed tests, is that the policy outcome of interest is whether the coeffi cient on tax redistributivity is closer to zero or one; not whether it is precisely zero or precisely one. Any coefficient above one would mean that a rise in tax redistributivity was more than compensated for by a rise in wage inequality. Likewise, a coeffi cient below zero would mean that a rise in tax redistributivity led to an additional fall in wage inequality. These fi ndings carry the same policy implications as if the coeffi cient had been-respectively-precisely one or precisely zero.
These null hypotheses are calculated for current taxes, lagged taxes, and both current and lagged taxes. Thus a reader whose prior was that taxes affected wage inequality immediately would focus only on the "Current taxes" F-tests, while a reader whose prior was that taxes affected wage inequality only with some lag would focus on the "Lagged taxes" F-tests. A reader who originally thought that the effect was some combination of current and lagged taxes would focus on the "Current and lagged taxes" F-tests. Table 1 shows the results of these specifi cations. With between zero and six lags, the coeffi cient on the contemporaneous tax rate is negative, and the linear sum of the lags is always negative. The hypothesis that wage inequality does not rise in response to a rise in tax redistributivity cannot be rejected in any specifi cation. For the specifi cation in which wage inequality is regressed on current taxes, the results are similar if the sample is broken into the pre-TRA86 period (1983) (1984) (1985) and the post-TRA86 period (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . 8 The linear sum is estimated using the lincom command in Stata. Roger Newson describes the calculation of the standard error on a linear sum as follows: If b is the vector of coeffi cients, V is the covariance matrix of b, and a is a vector defi ning the linear combination, then the standard error of the linear combination is calculated as (a'Va) 0.5 . So the standard error of the average of n coeffi cients is 1/n*(a'Va)
It is important to note that the F-tests in Table 1 relate to current taxes, the sum of lagged taxes, and the sum of current and lagged tax rates. This is not the same as an F-test on the joint signifi cance of the lags, which is a test of whether any of the lags are signifi cantly different from zero (or from one). The rationale for focusing on the sum of the lags is that from a policy perspective, what matters most is the aggregate effect of tax redistribution on wage inequality, rather than whether redistribution causes inequality to fl uctuate. However, the results are substantively unchanged if the hypothesis testing is based on joint signifi cance testing instead of testing the sum of the coeffi cients. The hypothesis that none of the coeffi cients are different from zero cannot be rejected in the fi rst two specifi cations in Table 1 . The hypothesis that none of the coeffi cients are different from zero can be rejected (at the fi ve percent level) in the third and fourth specifi cations of Table 1 , but this is solely due to the fourth lag of tax redistribution, which has a negative coeffi cient, not a positive coeffi cient. The hypothesis that none of the coeffi cients are different from one can be rejected for all specifi cations in Table 1 . Overall, the joint F-tests suggest that more redistributive taxes may cause inequality to fl uctuate downwards (after a four-year lag), but they provide no evidence of a positive relationship between tax redistributivity The sum of lagged taxes?
The sum of current and lagged tax rates? Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in brackets. *, ** and, *** denote statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. "Tax Redistribution" is the negative of the Reynolds-Smolensky index, calculated as GB -GA (see text for details). Time-varying state characteristics are log real personal income per capita, the unemployment rate, the unionization rate, the sales tax rate, the maximum estate/inheritance tax rate, and an indicator for whether the state has an estate tax. Sample is restricted to inequality observations from [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . Sample size for all specifi cations is 1,020.
By contrast, the null hypothesis that pre-tax inequality fully adjusts in response to taxes can be rejected in all 11 specifi cations, indicating that the main conclusion is not sensitive to the particular lag structure or form of the null hypothesis. This provides strong evidence that the effect of more redistributive state taxes is not undone by a subsequent rise in pre-tax inequality. This result is at odds with Feldstein and Wrobel (1998), who fi nd-using individual-level data from 1983 and 1989-that gross wages fully adjust to changes in taxes within six years.
As Table 1 demonstrates, these results are not particularly sensitive to the number of lags of the tax redistribution variable that are included in the regression. Table 2 also presents four additional robustness checks. The fi rst check omits the time-varying state controls, as a way of testing whether the previous results are sensitive to these controls. The second check weights states by their 2002 population, to account for the fact that wage inequality will typically be better measured in larger states, since there are more CPS observations for these states. The third check omits state fi xed effects, and estimates the model using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) (though still including year fi xed effects, since these absorb most changes in federal taxes). And the fourth check estimates the model with random state effects, rather than fi xed state effects.
None of these robustness checks seems to have a substantial impact on the main results. As in Table 1 , none of the F-tests in Table 2 reject the hypothesis that (in sum) pre-tax inequality is unaffected by tax redistributivity, while they do tend to reject the hypothesis that wage inequality fully adjusts to a change in the level of tax redistribution. The exceptions are in columns 3 and 4: the hypothesis of full adjustment in response to the current tax rate cannot be rejected in the specifi cations without state effects, or with random state effects. I do not place much weight on these results, however, since a Hausman test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the random effects estimator is consistent, suggesting that the fixed effects results should be preferred.
10 Overall, the results in Table 2 provide further reassurance that the results are not driven by some idiosyncratic feature of the primary specifi cation.
HOW DO REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXES AFFECT THE TOP AND BOTTOM OF THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION?
While the results in the previous section suggest that more redistributive taxes do not cause the distribution of gross wages to fully adjust, it is possible that a stronger impact is felt by tax reforms that affect either the bottom or top of the distribution. This could occur if either the poor or the rich were particularly sensitive to tax changes. A straightforward way to test this is to use a measure of income distribution that places more weight on one or other of the ends of the distribution. A natural choice is the S-Gini (Donaldson and Weymark, 1980) , a scale-free index that allows for a fl exible inequality aversion parameter, δ, which determines the social weight to be applied to parts of the distribution.
The area under the Lorenz Curve, L(p), represents the proportion of total income going to the bottom fraction p of a population with individual income y and mean income μ. If the cumulative density funcand inequality in any period. An alternative approach would be to test for Granger causality, which requires including a lagged dependent variable, and omitting the current tax redistribution variable; in other words, modifying equation [2] by replacing (GB -GA) st with GB st-1 . Estimating this model produces qualitatively similar results. 10 To take account of the fact that standard errors are clustered at the state level, the Hausman test is estimated using the overid command (Schaffer and Stillman, 2006) . The sum of lagged taxes?
The sum of current and lagged tax rates? Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. "Tax Redistribution" is the negative of the Reynolds-Smolensky index, calculated as GB -GA (see text for details). Time-varying state characteristics are log real personal income per capita, the unemployment rate, the unionization rate, the sales tax rate, the maximum estate/inheritance tax rate, and an indicator for whether the state has an estate tax. Sample is restricted to inequality observations from [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . Sample size for all specifi cations is 1,020.
tion of the population is F(y) and the pth quantile of income is F -1 (p), the Lorenz Curve is
The S-Gini is, therefore, given by the formula
A consistent estimator for the S-Gini, where y 1:n ≤ y 2:n ≤ … ≤ y n:n are the order statistics for income of n individuals, is 
: where δ ≤ 1, the S-Gini is undefi ned. For 1 < δ < 2, the index places more weight on the top of the distribution, while for δ > 2, the index places progressively more weight on the bottom of the distribution. When δ = 2, the S-Gini is identical to the Gini coeffi cient. For a more detailed discussion of the properties of the S-Gini, see Lambert (1993) , Barrett and Donald (2002) , and Zitikis and Gastwirth (2002) . Therefore it is straightforward to use the S-Gini to develop alternative measures of the redistributive effect of taxation, weighting the top and bottom of the distribution differently. In the second section, estimates were presented for a redistribution measure based on the Gini coeffi cient. Where R δ is a redistribution measure based on the S-Gini:
Here, I present four alternative measures of redistributive effect; two that place more weight than the Gini-derived measure on the top of the income distribution:
[7] R 1.25 = SGB 1.25 -SGA 1.25 ;
[8] R 1.5 = SGB 1.5 -SGA 1.5 .
And two that place more weight than the Gini-derived measure on the bottom of the income distribution:
[9] R 2.5 = SGB 2.5 -SGA 2.5 ;
[10] R 3.5 = SGB 3.5 -SGA 3.5 .
Summary statistics for each measure are presented in Appendix Table 1 .
In each instance, I estimate the impact on the corresponding pre-tax S-Gini coefficient, with current redistribution and six lags of redistribution as the independent variables of interest. For example, in the case of the redistribution measure where δ = 1.25, I estimate the equation:
[11] SGB 1.25, st = α + β1(SGB 
The interpretation of β is, therefore, analogous to the second section. If β = 1, then a tax system that has the mechanical effect of reducing the S-Gini δ leads to a behavioral change that increases the S-Gini δ by the same amount, while if β = 0, the redistributive effect of taxation, as measured by the change in the S-Gini δ , has no impact on the distribution of gross wages. Table 3 shows the results using the four alternative redistribution indices. While the effect of tax-induced redistribution on current wages appears to be slightly stronger at the top of the distribution, there is little difference between the four specifi cations. As with the Gini-derived redistribution measure (δ = 2), the hypothesis that wage inequality does not rise in response to more redistributive taxes is not rejected in any specifi cation. However, The sum of lagged taxes?
The sum of current and lagged tax rates? Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. "Tax Redistribution" is the negative of the Reynolds-Smolensky index, calculated as SGB δ -SGA δ (see text for details). Time-varying state characteristics are log real personal income per capita, the unemployment rate, the unionization rate, the sales tax rate, the maximum estate/inheritance tax rate, and an indicator for whether the state has an estate tax. Sample is restricted to inequality observations from [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . Sample size for all specifi cations is 1,020.
the null hypothesis that pre-tax inequality fully adjusts in response to taxes can be rejected in all 12 specifi cations. This provides evidence that states that impose a heavier tax burden on the rich do not see a sudden rise in top wage incomes, and similarly that states that impose a heavier tax burden on the poor do not see a sudden rise in wages towards the bottom of the distribution.
MIGRATION, INCOME, AND POST-TAX INEQUALITY
In the previous two sections, I found that the redistributive effect of state taxes had no signifi cant impact on the pre-tax distribution of hourly wages. Here, I consider three other parts of the story: the impact of tax redistribution on mobility, post-tax inequality, and personal income.
First, does the redistributive effect of taxation tax drive interstate mobility?
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To test this, I use six measures of population mobility: the fraction of a state's adult population that moved in from another state during the year, the fraction of a state's population that has moved out to another state during the year, the ratio of in-movers' hourly wages to non-movers' wages, the ratio of outmovers' hourly wages to non-movers' wages, the change in the state's log population in that year, and the log of the state population. The fi rst four variables are taken from the March CPS, so measures in year t relate to migration not from January t to December t, but from March t until March t + 1.
12 Details of variable construction are provided in the Data Appendix. As in earlier tables, all these specifi cations include state fi xed effects, year fi xed effects, and region-specifi c linear time trends. Note that state fi xed effects have a different effect in columns 5 and 6. In column 5, the state fi xed effect absorbs unobservable state-specifi c factors affecting the growth rate of a state's population, while in column 6, the state fi xed effect absorbs unobservable state-specifi c factors affecting the level of a state's population. Each of the specifi cations includes the current tax redistributivity variable, and six lags of tax redistributivity.
Recall that in Tables 1, 2 , and 3, I estimated one-tailed F-tests, against the null hypotheses that the tax coeffi cients were ≤0 or ≥1. Here, I estimate standard twotailed F-tests, against the null hypothesis that taxes have no aggregate impact on interstate migration.
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that-in sum-tax changes do not impact interstate population fl ows, nor do they affect the relative wages of movers. Only three of the 18 F-tests are statistically signifi cant: in the lagged specifi cation, more redistributive taxes are associated with a fall in the relative wages of incoming migrants, and in the current and summed specifi cations, more redistributive taxes are associated with a smaller population. However, the relationship between population size and tax redistributivity becomes statistically insignifi cant when the model is specifi ed with log population in differences (column 5) rather than levels (column 6). The association between 11 It is also plausible that the reverse is true: if for some exogenous reason a state's population becomes less mobile, then the state government, following the dictum of Mirrlees (1982) (that the optimal amount of redistribution by a state is a declining function of the degree of mobility in response to taxes), implements more redistributive taxes. This theory is not tested here. 12 One possible solution would be to convert the March t to March t + 1 data into January t to December t data by the simple formula: X(Jan t: Dec t) = 0.25X (Mar t -1: Mar t) + 0.75X(Mar t: Mar t + 1). Unfortunately, because mobility rates are missing for several years, this kind of averaging reduces the sample size too severely. Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, levels, respectively. "TR" is the negative of the Reynolds-Smolensky index, calculated as GB -GA (see text for details). The population growth rate (column 5) is the change in log population from year t -1 to year t. Time-varying state characteristics are log real personal income per capita, the unemployment rate, the unionization rate, the sales tax rate, the maximum estate/inheritance tax rate, and an indicator for whether the state has an estate tax. Dependent variables in columns 1 to 4 are measured from March t to March t+1 . population and taxes is, therefore, fragile at best.
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I now turn to the question of how redistributive taxes affect income and the post-tax distribution of income. This question is particularly pertinent in the light of Feldstein and Wrobel's (1998, p. 392 ) conclusion:
here can be no trade-off at the state level between distribution goals and economic effi ciency. Shifts in state tax progressivity, by altering the structure of employment in the state and distorting the mix of labor inputs used by firms in the state, create deadweight efficiency losses without achieving any net local redistribution of real incomes."
Using a similar empirical approach to that used to analyze migration, it is possible to directly test the impact of more redistributive state taxation systems have on post-tax inequality and mean percapita income. Post-tax inequality is measured from the same March CPS surveys as were used to calculate pre-tax inequality. However, in this case, annual earnings and family characteristics are fi rst used to calculate each individual's average tax rate (ATR), and the pre-tax hourly wage is then multiplied by {1 -ATR} to arrive at a post-tax hourly wage. Within each state, I then calculate the distribution of these post-tax hourly wages. Figure 5 shows the post-tax Ginis, which have a mean of 0.33 and a standard deviation of 0.015. As a measure of personal income, I use the log of real state personal income per capita. In both cases, I estimate two-tailed F-tests against the null that tax redistribution has no impact on the dependent variable.
With regard to the distribution of post-tax hourly wages, the results from column 1 of Table 5 suggest that more redistributive taxes do (with some lag) lead to a more equal distribution of income. From years t -6 to t, a tax system that mechanically reduces wage inequality by one standard deviation (0.3 Gini points) leads to a 0.8 point drop (0.003 × -2.5) in the post-tax Gini, an effect that is statistically signifi cant at the one percent level.
As to the potential effi ciency cost of more redistributive taxes, the results in column 2 do not support the theory that more redistributive taxes harm a state's economy. Indeed, more redistributive taxes appear to be associated with slightly more rapid economic growth. A tax system that is one standard deviation more redistributive is associated with a four percent increase (0.003 × 14.6) in the growth rate over the years t -6 to t, an effect that is statistically signifi cant at the fi ve percent level.
14 13 An alternative approach to estimating F-tests on the sum of the tax coeffi cients is to estimate joint F-tests against the null hypothesis that all of the tax redistribution coeffi cients are equal to zero. These reject the null in column 4, where the dependent variable is the ratio of out-movers' hourly wages to non-movers' wages (F = 2.66, P = 0.02). This result is driven by the fi rst lag, which has a positive coeffi cient; suggesting that more redistributive taxes are associated with high-wage outmigration after one year (though as the summed coeffi cients show, they have no aggregate impact over a seven-year period). A joint F-test also rejects the hypothesis that all of the tax redistribution coeffi cients are equal to zero in column 6, where the dependent variable is log population (F = 1.93, P = 0.08). In this case, the largest t-statistic is on the current tax redistributivity variable, which has a negative coeffi cient, suggesting that more redistributive state taxes are associated with a smaller population (though as the insignifi cant results in column 5 show, this result is not robust to specifying the dependent variable in differences instead of levels). 14 The empirical literature on state taxes and economic growth has tended not to focus on redistributivity, but on average or marginal tax rates. The results from these studies are mixed: for recent reviews of the evidence, see Holcombe and Lacombe (2004) and Bania, Gray, and Stone (2007) .
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TAXATION AND INEQUALITY
Until this point, I have assumed that taxes drive inequality. But might the reverse be true? Discussing the conclusions of Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) , Bakija and Slemrod (2004, p. 56, n5) argue that observing a positive relationship between tax redistribution and inequality of gross hourly wages would also be consistent with a "stabilizing" political economy explanation, under which states with more unequal wage distributions implement more redistributive taxation systems.
It is also possible that politics operates in the opposite direction, and that states with more equal wage distributions tend to implement more redistributive taxation systems. One reason that this might occur is if the average value of public goods to members of a community increases as heterogeneity decreases (as suggested by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999) . Another possibility is that if the rich experience an increase in their incomes, they may channel part of this into campaign contributions to candidates who prefer less redistributive taxation.
One way of testing these two theories is to estimate almost the reverse regression to that presented in equation [2] . Instead of looking at the effect of current and lagged taxes on inequality, I now explore whether lagged inequality appears to have any aggregate impact on tax redistribution. Of course, it is not possible to test whether inequality in the current period affects tax redistribution in the current period. But inherent in the political economy explanations is some notion of a lag, so this test should be fairly robust. Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. "Tax Redistribution" is the negative of the Reynolds-Smolensky index, calculated as GB -GA (see text for details). Time-varying state characteristics in column 1 are log real personal income per capita, the unemployment rate, the unionization rate, the sales tax rate, the maximum estate/inheritance tax rate, and an indicator for whether the state has an estate tax. In column 2, the same set of time-varying state characteristics are included, with the exception of log real personal income per capita. Table 6 indicates little evidence of a relationship between inequality and the tax structure that states choose. Although the linear sum of the inequality coeffi cients is positive in the second and third columns (consistent with Bakija and Slemrod's critique of the fi ndings of Feldstein and Wrobel), it is not statistically signifi cant at conventional levels. As a result, the claim that policymakers opt for redistributive taxes as a brake on rising wage inequality remains merely suggestive.
CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to estimate the extent to which interstate migration thwarts attempts by states to reduce inequality via more redistributive taxes. Using a Gini-based index of tax redistribution for U.S. states over the period 1977-2002, I fi nd little evidence that-in aggregate-more redistributive state taxes lead to a more unequal distribution of pre-tax hourly wages. This remains true when alternative measures of redistribution are used, placing more weight on the bottom or on the top of the distribution. Evidence from population fl ows helps corroborate this: overall, more redistributive state taxes do not appear to have a substantial impact on the composition or volume of interstate migration.
Given that the pre-tax wages distribution does not adjust to offset the effect of redistributive taxes, it should be Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. "Tax Redistribution index" is the negative of the Reynolds-Smolensky index, calculated as GB -GA (see text for details). Time-varying state characteristics are log real personal income per capita, the unemployment rate, the unionization rate, the sales tax rate, the maximum estate/inheritance tax rate, and an indicator for whether the state has an estate tax.
unsurprising that more redistributive taxation is associated with a more equal distribution of post-tax hourly wages. Regarding the effi ciency cost of taxation, I fi nd no evidence that states with more redistributive taxes experience slower growth in per capita personal income.
(If anything, states with redistributive taxes grow faster.) Looking at the effect of inequality on redistribution, I fi nd that past inequality is positively associated with more redistributive taxes in the current period, though the effect is not statistically signifi cant. While this paper presents evidence that migration does not undo the effects of redistributive taxes at a state level, it nonetheless seems plausible that at a suffi ciently small geographic level, this effect will occur. For example, it may be that at a city level, redistributive taxes are unable to affect the post-tax distribution of income.
Inequality measures are calculated from the March CPS, using Stephen Jenkins' "ineqdeco" Stata routine. Person-weights were used, and hourly wages were not adjusted for family size. To avoid extreme values biasing the calculations, hourly wages below a minimum value are omitted and those above an upper threshold are truncated. In 2002, the minimum value was one dollar and the top-code was $500. In earlier years, these numbers are indexed to changes in average wages. For example in 1977, observations with hourly wages below $0.27 were dropped, while the top code was set at $134.11 per hour.
Since I calculate hourly wages as annual earnings divided by the total number of hours worked in the previous year, the number of hourly wage observations that are top coded in each year is affected by the top coding of annual earnings in the CPS. In income years 1977 -1980 , this is set at $50,000, in 1981 -1983 at $75,000, and in 1984 -1994 at $99,999. From 1995 , top coded values were given the mean value for all top coded observations (e.g., in 1995, all those who earned $150,000 or more were assigned earnings of $576,372). This change does not appear to have had a major impact on the number of hourly wage observations that I top coded, which ranged from 8-40 in income years 1977-1994, and from 27-58 in income years [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . The number of top coded hourly wage observations was 40 in 1994, and 48 in 1995.
Although the CPS is designed to be representative at a state level, the person-weights that are provided are calculated based on national demographics, rather than state demographics. However, this is unlikely to make a substantial difference. Using the CPS to calculate trends in inequality in California, a state whose demographic composition is very different to the nation as a whole, Reed, Haber, and Mameesh (1996, Appendix B) used census data to form new CPS weights for California, and found that it made virtually no difference to their estimates.
Tax Redistribution
To calculate redistribution measures, I use a national sample comprising a randomly selected ten percent of the March 1990 CPS (15,847 individuals). Income is indexed by multiplying each family's income by (MedEarn st / MedEarn 1990 ), where MedEarn st is median family income in a given state and year, and MedEarn 1990 is the median family income across the United States in 1990 ($38,640) . This ensures that the distribution of earnings remains unchanged, but that incomes are at an appropriate level for the tax brackets in a given state and year.
For example, median family earnings in North Dakota in 1984 were $23,491, so in order to calculate tax redistribution, I take the 15,847 individuals from in the 1990 CPS sample, multiply their incomes by 0.607 ($23,491/$38,640) , then assign them the state code for North Dakota, and the year 1984.
Each state-year sample is then fed through the National Bureau of Economic Research's Taxsim program (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) , version 5.1. To simplify calculations, I assume that all family income is wage income, that individuals fi le as singles, and couples fi le jointly (with two-thirds of the income assigned to the primary earner). Dependent child exemptions and age exemptions are taken into account. Post-tax income is net of state and federal taxes, but not net of FICA, which is regarded as akin to savings. Taxsim covers all 50 states plus the District of Columbia from 1977-2002. Therefore I feed the same sample (with incomes indexed according to the median income in that state and year) through the Taxsim program a total of 1,326 times (51 × 26). The ratio of post-tax income to pre-tax income gives (1 -ATR).
To calculate a measure of tax redistribution as it applies to hourly wages, I calculate pre-tax hourly earnings in the same manner as for the state inequality statistics, i.e., by dividing annual earnings for the previous year by the total number of hours worked in the previous year. As with the inequality measures, the sample is restricted to those aged 16-55, and the same bottom-coding and top-coding rules are applied to pre-tax hourly earnings. The pre-tax Gini coeffi cient for all states and years remains constant at 0.36, while the pre-tax S-Ginis are 0.15 (δ = 1.25), 0.24 (δ = 1.5), 0.43 (δ = 2.5), and 0.52 (δ = 3.5). Post-tax hourly earnings are then calculated by multiplying pre-tax earnings by (1 -ATR). The difference between the Gini (S-Gini) of pre-tax hourly earnings and the corresponding Gini (S-Gini) for post-tax hourly earnings is the measure of tax redistribution in a given state and year.
Other State Variables
Migration rates and hourly wages are calculated from March CPS data, applying the same sample restrictions as used in calculating the inequality measures (sample restricted to adults aged 16-55, hourly wages bottom and top-coded). Since the mobility question was only asked for the income years 1981-1984, 1986-1994, and 1996-2002, the Note: All specifi cations are restricted to dependent variables that are measured over the period [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . The maximum number of lags of the tax rate variables is six, so summary statistics for tax rates cover the years 1977-2002. 
